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ROBERT C. OWENS *
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
Recent years have seen public pressure brought on the United
States Congress to enact reform legislation to deregulate the aviation
industry. After several years of legislative investigation and debate,
Congress enacted the Airlines Deregulation Act of 1978, (ADA)'
which made significant alterations and additions to the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 (Act).2  In the months preceeding the enactment of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the administrative agency
charged with approval and disapproval of carrier proposals, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), revamped its policies and embarked on an
era of promoting competition in the areas of carrier certification,
routes, and fares. The most significant of these innovations was the
award of permissive operating authority and the consideration of low
fare proposals in the selection of carriers for routes.
While permissive authority was only applied to international
markets on a limited basis, due to the restrictive nature of prior bilat-
eral agreements; the negotiating position of the United States in new
agreements promised the possibility of multiple authority. The pri-
mary focus of the Airline Deregulation Act is the liberalization of cer-
tification, route entry and exit, and pricing of services in interstate
and overseas air transportation. 3  Changes affecting foreign air trans-
• B.S., Auburn University; M.B.A., University of Tennessee; J.D. University of
Miami School of Law. Mr. Owens is currently on the legal staff of Eastern Air Lines,
Miami, Florida.
1. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
2. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1648 (1976 & Supp.).
3. Interstate air transportation is the carriage by aircraft of persons or property
as a common carrier for compensation or hire between two states within the United
States or wholly within a territory of the United States. 49 U.S.C. § 1 30 2 (21)(a)
(1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 2, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705 (1978).
Overseas air transportation relates to carriage between a state and a territory or
possession, or between two territories or possessions. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(21)(b) (1976)
as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 2, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat.
1705 (1978).
REPORT: AVIATION
portation" were not as extensive as those affecting interstate and
overseas air transportation but did not reverse the liberalizing trend
established by the Board under the pre-existing provisions of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
In actions commenced by the airlines before the enactment of
the ADA, the CAB indicated its willingness to move away from heavy
regulation. In the Application of Piedmont Aviation, Inc . 5 Piedmont
sought a certificate amendment to extend its route authority to Bos-
ton. In the course of issuing a show cause order, the CAB deter-
mined that it would grant authority without a formal oral evidentiary
hearing "unless a substantial probability is shown that it will be seri-
ously harmful to the domestic air transportation system." Con-
sequently, neither losses to the shareholders of the applicant carrier,
nor diversion of traffic or revenues from incumbent carriers, was
found to be harmful to the air transportation system unless such
losses or diversion would threaten the carrier's ability to perform its
certificate obligations, or would necessarily result in termination of
essential services without replacement. 6  In tentatively granting the
new form of "permissive authority," the CAB set forth the test that
the applicant need only "make a reasonably plausible showing that
the experience could be a success" and indicated that such authority
would be denied only if it were "clearly and patently impractical from
an economic standpoint."7' The CAB later granted the certificate
amendment and further ratified the expected non-hearing procedure
which depends on the market place to determine whether the new
service is required for the public convenience and necessity. 8
In the Oakland Service Case,9 the CAB instituted a proceeding
to determine the need for additional authority at Oakland, California
to fifteen designated points. The Board proposed a "novel and ex-
perimental procedure" for conducting the case. Instead of a single
bearing before an administrative law judge, they proposed an initial
hearing to determine the issues of public convenience and necessity
4. Foreign air transportation relates to carriage between "a place in the United
States and any place outside thereof .... "" 49 U.S.C. § 1301(21)(c) (1976) as
amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 2, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978).
5. C.A.B. Order 78-4-69 (Apr. 14, 1978).
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 6-7.
8. C.A.B. Order 78-8-97 (Aug. 17, 1978).
9. C.A.B. Order 78-4-121 (Apr. 19, 1978).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
and a second to determine the fitness of applicants. Whereas previous
cases were slow, expensive and complicated due to the issue of com-
petitive carrier selection, tile Board decided to award "permissive,
subsidy ineligible authority in each market where a need for new
authority is shown, to every fit, willing, and able applicant." 10
In an order instituting the Chicago-Albany/Syracuse-Boston
Competitive Service Investigation," the CAB decided that as a matter
of general policy, the Board would thereafter consider the offer or
failure to offer lower prices. Low fares would be weighed "in deter-
mining whether the public convenience and necessity require the
award of new or additional authority, and if so, which carrier or car-
riers should be selected." The Board also "expects the record to be
developed to examine the need for and feasibility of various new
price/quality options." Price options include "reduced normal fares,
promotional fares, and off-peak pricing." Quality options include "re-
duced on board amenities, higher seating densities, increased load
factors, and improved aircraft utilization." The Board further
suggested the possibility of making the awards contingent upon the
continued price performance of the carrier. 12 Further, the adminis-
trative law judge was directed to determine whether any new au-
thority should be permissive, and, if so, whether multiple awards
should be made and whether such awards would encourage real price
competition. 13
In Philadelphia-Bermtuda Nonstop Proceeding,'14 the CAB has in-
stituted an investigation to determine whether the public conveni-
ence and necessity requires nonstop service between Philadelphia
and Bermuda as authorized by the Bermuda II Agreement.' 5 After
eliminating the traditional hearing before the administrative law
judge, the Board awarded multiple permissive authority to all five
applicants at the close of oral arguments to the Board. 16
In Florida-Mexico City Investigation,1 an investigation was insti-
tuted by the CAB when Pan American World Airways applied for
10. Id. at 3.
11. C.A.B. Order 77-12-50 (Dec. 9, 1977).
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id. at 4.
14. C.A.B. Order 78-6-22 (June 1, 1978).
15. United States-Kingdom Air Services Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 8641 (1978).
16. The Board decision was submitted to the President of the United States on
September 19, 1978.
17. C.A.B. Order 78-6-59 (June 8, 1978).
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authority to suspend service between Florida and Mexico City, and
four United States domestic trunk carriers filed for certificate
amendments and interim exemption authority to initiate service. As
in numerous recent cases, the CAB solicited low fare proposals indi-
cating that such proposals would be persuasive in determining which
carrier would receive the authority."8 The CAB also recently insti-
tuted the Yucatan Service Case to consider the issues of new author-
ity between Merida, Cancun, and Cozumel, Mexico. 19
As the CAB moved away from heavy regulation and toward an
environment of greater freedom of competition among carriers, Board
policy evolved at a rapid pace. Indicative of this pace was the Board's
adoption of low fares as a major factor in carrier selection in De-
cember of 197720 and retreat from that position only seven months
later. In the Florida Services Case,21 the Board deemphasized low
fare proposals and stated that it would thereafter depend upon com-
petitive market forces to set the optimum service and optimum price
levels. These competitive market forces would be assured by grants of
"permissive authority" to any applicant carrier that was fit, willing,
and able. 22  However, it appeared that low fare proposals would con-
tinue to be a major factor in cases which were specifically instituted
to consider the certification of additional carriers who would initiate
low fares in specified markets.
23
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
Prior to the enactment of the ADA on October 24, 1978, the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 drew no policy distinctions between in-
terstate, overseas, and foreign air transportation. The ADA provides
for different treatment of interstate and overseas air transportation
than for foreign air transportation. 24 The "Declaration of Policy" set
forth in the ADA did not change the factors which, in the perfor-
18. Id. at 3-4.
19. C.A.B. Order 78-8-100 (Aug. 17, 1978).
20. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
21. C.A.B. Order 78-7-128 (July 25, 1978).
22. Id. at 4.
23. E.g., United States-Benelux Low-Fare Proceeding, C.A.B. Order 78-6-97
(June 13,1978).
24. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 41976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 3,
Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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mance of its powers and duties pursuant to the Act, the CAB should
consider as being in the public interest and in accord with the public
convenience and necessity in foreign air transportation. 25  However,
the ADA substantially altered and expanded the factors to be consid-
ered in interstate and overseas air transportation. 26  By such new
factors Congress has made clear its intent that the CAB should foster
a system of air transportation that places maximum reliance on actual
and potential competition.
27
Before the passage of the ADA, the CAB awarded a route certifi-
cate to an applicant only if the applicant was fit, willing, and able to
perform the transportation properly, and if such transportation was
"required" by the public convenience and necessity. 28  After the
ADA was enacted this test was retained for foreign air transportation,
but a substantially altered test was adopted for interstate and overseas
air transportation. 29 With respect to an application for interstate and
overseas air transportation, the CAB shall issue the certificate upon
finding that it is "consistent" with the public convenience and neces-
sity. 30  In addition, the ADA reversed the burden of proof; an oppo-
nent of the application now has the burden of showing, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that such air transportation is not consistent
with the public convenience and necessity. 3 1 The criteria for
decision-making regarding applications for interstate or overseas air
transportation certificates is now more liberal than the criteria applied
to applications for foreign^air transportation certificates. However,
since the ADA did not alter the criteria regarding applications for
foreign air transportation certificates, the recent innovations-
multiple and/or permissive awards 32 developed by the CAB prior
to the enactment of the ADA should still be valid.
The ADA added a new provision which allows for the automatic
issuance of route authority to the first fit, willing, and able applicant
to a market where an incumbent certificated carrier has not operated
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (a) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 3(a), Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
28. 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (d)(1) (1976) (amended 1978).
29. 49 U.S.C. 1371(d)(1) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 8, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
30. Id.
31. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§14, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
32. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
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at least five roundtrips per week for thirteen of the previous twenty-
six weeks. 33 This "dormant authority" provision only applies to in-
terstate and overseas air transportation, requires that the applicant for
such dormant authority inaugurate and maintain a certain minimum
service level, and provides for suspension of the incumbent carrier.
3 4
The ADA granted the "fill-up" rights long sought by United
States air carriers. If an air carrier holds a certificate to engage in
foreign air transportation, it may carry passengers or property in in-
terstate or overseas air transportation on at least one scheduled
roundtrip flight per day in each market, unless the CAB authorizes
additional flights per day. 35 A certificate to engage in foreign charter
air transportation shall designate the terminal and intermediate points
only so far as the CAB deems practicable. Otherwise, the certificate
need only designate the general geographic area within which such
services may be provided.
36
Before the passage of the ADA, an air carrier had to apply to the
CAB for authorization to abandon service or to temporarily suspend
service to a city. 37 Under the ADA, a carrier may suspend service
after giving ninety days notice.38 If the city is within the United
States and the suspension or reduction in service will cause the serv-
ice to the city to fall below a minimum level- "essential air trans-
portation"-the CAB may then require the suspending carrier to
maintain subsidized service until a replacement is found.
3 9
The ADA requires that the CAB establish simplified procedures
for air carriers to obtain certificates to engage in interstate, overseas,
and foreign air transportation and for foreign carriers to obtain per-
mits to engage in foreign air transportation. These simplified proce-
dures need not require a formal, oral, evidentiary hearing.
40
33. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 10, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
34. Id.
35. 49 U.S.C.§ 1371(d) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§11, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
36. 49 U.S.C. 1371(e) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 15, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
37. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j) (1976) (amended 1978).
38. Id., as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 19, Pub. L. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705 (1978).
39. Id. See 49 U.S.C. tit. IV (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 § 33, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
40. 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 21, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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The CAB's jurisdiction over approval of mergers, acquisitions,
and other similar transactions was limited by the passage of the ADA.
Congress intended that the CAB evaluate these transactions in the
same manner that they are evaluated in an unregulated industry
41
i.e., the approval of a transaction need not be accompanied by a grant
of immunity from antitrust prosecution. 42 Before the ADA was
enacted, all agreements or contracts affecting air transportation had to
be filed with the CAB which was under an obligation to disapprove
those contracts or agreements that were adverse to the public in-
terest. 43 Approval of an agreement or contract by the CAB automat-
ically invoked the antitrust immunity provision.4 4  Under the ADA,
this mandatory filing requirement is retained only for foreign air tran-
sportation.4 5  In addition, the antitrust immunity provision was made
discretionary; approval of an agreement or contract by the CAB no
longer automatically functions as a shield from antitrust prosecution .
4
6
The CAB's power to exempt persons from the requirements of
the Act has been liberalized. If the CAB finds that the exemption is
"consistent with the public interest," it may exempt a person from a
provision of the Act or from a CAB rule or regulation.
47
The ADA also explicitly set out the reasons for which a CAB
decision regarding an international route may be submitted to the
President of the United States for review. The President may review
and reject, or alter such a decision only for reasons of national se-
curity or foreign relations pursuant to his constitutional powers. The
President may not reject or alter the CAB's decision for economic
reasons or for reasons of carrier selection. If the President takes no
41. 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 26, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. H12655 (daily ed. Oct.
12, 1978) (JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE'COMMITTEE OF CONFER-
ENCE).
42. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 30. Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976) (amended 1978).
44. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976) (amended 1978).
45. 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 28, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
46. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 30, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
47. 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 31, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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action within sixty days, the decision becomes effective but, as a deci-
sion of the CAB, not the President, and as such is subject to judicial
review.
48
The ADA established a "zone of reasonableness" which is to be
applied by passenger fares in interstate and overseas air trans-
portation. If a passenger fare falls within the zone, the CAB may not
disapprove it on the grounds that it is unjust or unreasonable. By July
1, 1979, the zone will range from seventy percent below the standard
industry fare level (normal full fare level) to five percent above such
level. 49
The ADA includes a "sunset provision" which provides for the
phased elimination of most of the various regulatory functions of the
CAB by January 1, 1985. Those functions of the CAB not phased out
will be transferred to other executive departments. On January 1,
1985, all CAB authority over foreign air transportation will be trans-
ferred to the Department of Transportation which shall exercise such
authority in consultation with the Department of State.50
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AsSOCIATION
On June 9, 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) adopted an
order to show cause why it should not remove its approval of the
agreements that allow the creation and operation of regional traffic
conferences by members of the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA). 5 ' The regional traffic conferences facilitate the negotia-
tion of prices and terms of service which are provided uniformly by
the world's air carriers. Since 1946, the CAB has provided anti-trust
immunity for such inter-carrier agreements (resolutions) under sec-
tions 412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act.
s2
According to a majority of the Board members, the primary
reason for reviewing its approval is that the "c]ircumstances have
changed dramatically since 1946."5 3  In 1946, the CAB had limited
48. 49 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (1976) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 34, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
49. 49 U.S.C. 1482(d) (1976 & Supp.) as amended by Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 § 37, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
50. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et. seq (1976 & Supp.) as amended by Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978 § 40 Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
51. C.A.B. Order 78-6-78, 43 Fed. Reg. 25839 (1978).
52. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1384 (1970).
53. 43 Fed. Reg. 25840.
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powers over fares and rates in international air transportation. Be-
cause the Federal Aviation Act in 1946 only provided for removal of
discrimination under section 1004(f)54 and approval or disapproval of
agreements under section 1412, 5 5 the majority asserted that the
Board had approved the agreements as a substitute for the CAB's lack
of statutory power to suspend and investigate international fares and
rates.5 6 However, in 1972, Congress empowered the Board to inves-
tigate, suspend, and cancel unlawful fares and rates in international
air transportation. 57 The majority also noted, as an additional reason
for the review, the shift from the post-war dominance of the United
States air carriers to an environment in which numerous foreign car-
riers also have the resources to engage in price competition. 58
The Board began its analysis by stating the settled principle that
"antitrust immunity should be granted only where failure to do so
would frustrate the achievement of explicit statutory objectives."
' 59
They determined that the standard for approval of anti -competitive
arrangements is whether the agreement is required by a serious
transportation need, or is necessary to obtain important public ben-
efits. 60  Although either of these tests would have been met by the
circumstances existing in 1946, the Board questioned whether exter-
nal circumstances had not substantially changed since that time.6'
Further refining the method for review of the IATA agreements, the
Board decided to reanalyze the legality of anti-competitive agreements
in a two step process. First, the CAB would determine the direct or
indirect benefits accruing from the use of agreements vis-a-vis the
public interest standards of the Act. They would then determine the
necessity of using the agreement to achieve such benefits.
62
The Board recognized that not all JATA resolutions were anti-
competitive. They concluded:
In order to undertake this review, and in light of the Board's
long-established legal standard for approval of air carrier agree-
54. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(f) (1970).
55. 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970).
56. 43 Fed. Reg. 25840.
57. 49 U.S.C. § 14820) (1976) (enacted as § 100 2() of the Federal Aviation Act).
58. id.
59. 43 Fed. Reg. at 25841.
60. Id.; See Local Cartage Agreements Case, 15 C.A.B. 850, 853 (1952).
61. 43 Fed. Reg. 25840, 25841.
62. Id. at 25841.
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ments that may affect competition, the many changed cir-
cumstances since the Board's last review of the Traffic Conference
Resolution, and the Board's increased reliance on competition as a
means of insuring efficient and responsive air transportation, we
tentatively find that the Traffic Conference Resolution and related
agreements are no longer in the public interest and should no
longer be approved by the Board.
63
The Board then solicited comments regarding the costs and benefits
of disapproval of the system, replacement systems and the probable
role of multinational associations (such as the European Civil Aviation
Conference and the International Civil Aviation Organization), result-
ing effect of U.S. antitrust laws, adequacy of the Board's regulatory
powers, likelihood of reasonably competitive pricing absent IATA
agreements and differing treatment necessary for different regions of
the world or different phases of the air transportation business.
64
Board Member O'Melia concurred in the prospect of review of
the rate-fixing role of IATA, but dissented from the procedure chosen
by the majority and its apparent tenor.6 5 Given the long history of
beneficial service of IATA, he found the Board's action to be "abrupt
and ominous, in both tone and format." 6 6 Not only did Board
Member O'Melia disagree with the tentative findings and conclusions
of the majority, he found an "arbitrary and unilateral tone . . . which
is unnecessary and certain to cause irritation and resentment among
foreign governmental authorities." 67 lie further questioned the suf-
ficiency of the show cause order process for a matter more akin to
policy, especially after thirty years of Board approval. Board Member
O'Melia felt that not enough knowledge of the alternative systems
existed or could be obtained through the show cause order process to
justify such extraordinary impact on private interests. He also ques-
tioned whether Congress intended the 1972 amendment, which gave
the CAB control over rates, to have the effect of the Board relin-
quishing its control over rates to the Executive Department. This
outcome is especially doubtful since the Executive Department may
often be motivated by political and bureaucratic considerations and
not the free competition and economic considerations which the
Board obviously favors.
63. Id. at 25842 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 25842-45.
66. Id. at 25843.
67. Id.
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NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
On May 19, 1978, the United States Secretary of Transportation
issued the Proposed United States Policy for the Conduct of Interna-
tional Air Transportation Negotiations.68 The policy statement was
developed by an interagency group composed of the Departments of
State, Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Justice and the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, the Council on Wage and Price Sta-
bility, the Domestic Policy Staff and the Council of Economic Ad-
visors. Input by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the public also con-
tributed to the formulation of the policy statement. After revision
based on comments received at public hearings, the President ap-
proved the statement of negotiating policy on August 21, 1978.
The primary goal according to the policy statement is to provide
the greatest possible benefit to travelers and shippers by continued
development of affordable, convenient, efficient, and environmentally
acceptable air services. "Maximum consumer benefits can be best
achieved through preservation and extension of competition between
airlines in a fair market place," not by further protectionist restric-
tions. Actual and potential competition should determine the variety,
quality, and price of air service.
Since routes, prices, capacity, scheduled and charter rules, and
competitive pressure interact to form the spectrum of benefits obtain-
able from the air transportation industry, the policy establishes a
negotiating objective for each factor. First, the United States will
emphasize lower prices by promoting greater competition in fares and
rates in both scheduled and charter services. The mechanism for set-
ting fares, rates, and prices should be decided by the individual air-
lines. These decisions should be based, primarily, on competitive
considerations of the market place. However, one element added in
the revision of the proposed statement indicated that government
regulation would not be entirely foreclosed. Government regulation
should prevent predatory and discriminatory practices, protect con-
sumers from abuse of monopoly positions, and protect competitors
from prices which are artifically low due to government subsidies.
Negotiations will press for reduced restrictions on volume, frequency,
and regularity of charter flights. As to scheduled service, the United
States will seek to expand service by eliminating restrictions on capac-
68. 43 Fed. Reg. 22262 (1978).
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ity, frequency, and route and operating rights. The negotiating posi-
tion also envisions the elimination of unfair or destructive competitive
practices, especially those which discriminate in charges for the use of
airway and airport facilities. The primary impetus to competition will
be multiple airline designations in international markets. Such con-
structive competition is expected to increase service options and re-
duce prices. The negotiating stance will also seek to increase the
number of non-stop gateways. Finally the United States will promote
the full development of cargo services. The policy statement con-
cludes with a requirement of Presidential approval for bilateral
agreements that do not meet these "minimum" competitive objectives.
WARSAW CONVENTION
6 9
In Chandler v. Jet Air Freight, Inc., 70 the court held that inter-
national transportation as the term is used in article 1,71 is deter-
mined from the place of departure and the place of destination as
stated in the contract. Failure to place the goods into transit to the
destination which is a High Contracting Party does not prevent appli-
cation of the Convention.
Two recent cases, Fulton v. Lufthansa German Airlines 72 and
Kohli v. British Airways, 73 addressed the grant of jurisdiction set out
in article 28 of the Convention. In Fulton, a plaintiff's claim for dam-
age to checked baggage was dismissed for lack of subject matter juris-
diction because the forum state was not within the four forums
enumerated in article 28. The article 28 forums were held to be ex-
clusive and mandatory. In Kohli, the plaintiff's action for damages for
the theft of jewelry from checked baggage was also dismissed because
the forum was not within those listed in article 28. The plaintiff had
purchased a ticket for himself in London and had purchased tickets
for other members of his family in Boston. The Massachusetts court
held that jurisdiction under article 28(c) was determined by the place
of purchase of the plaintiff's ticket alone.
In Benjamins v. British European Airways,74 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit overruled a pervasive rule that had
69. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
70. 14 Avi. 18321 (I1l. App. Ct. 1977).
71. 49 Stat. 3000, Chapter 1, Art. 1 (2), T.S. No. 876 (1934).
72. 14 Avi. 18284 (I11. Cir. Ct. 1977).
73. 14 Avi. 18311 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977).
74. 572 F.2d 913, 14 Avi. 18369 (2d Cir. 1978).
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existed in the United States for over twenty years. Judge Lumbard
reversed his apparent position in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Ven-
ezolana75 and held that article 17 of the Warsaw Convention creates
its own cause of action.
In Upton v. Iran National Airlines Corp.,7 6 the court granted
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment since plaintiffs were
not "in the course of any of the operations of embarking" as that
phrase is used in article 17. Where the passengers were awaiting
flight information concerning a flight delayed by inclement weather,
the court held that the passengers were not under the control of the
carrier when the roof collapsed over passengers waiting in a public
area.
Although Air Canada v. Smith 77 did not involve an issue under
the Convention, such an issue may well arise in similar circumstances
in the future. In that case the court denied the carrier's liability on
the ground that the sovereign government of Canada required the
passengers to pass through the area of injury, an area over which the
carrier had no control. The court held that the air carrier had no duty
to warn or to look for peril. The passengers had deplaned in Montreal
from an Air Canada flight from New York and were attempting to
connect to another Air Canada flight to Quebec. Upon deplaning in
Montreal, plaintiffs were instructed to enter a certain restricted area
in order to pass through customs and immigration. While waiting for
the luggage, plaintiff tripped over an appendage protruding from a
baggage cart.
In Danziger v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,78 a passenger
sought to recover the value of jewelry which was missing from a
checked bag on arrival at her destination. The air carrier asserted, as
a defense, a tariff rule filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board. That
tariff purported to relieve the carrier of all liability for loss or damage
to jewelry and other valuables in checked baggage. The federal dis-
trict court held the tariff invalid because it conflicted with article 23
of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that "[a]ny provision tend-
ing to relieve the carrier of liability ... shall be null and void." The
court also refused to grant the carrier's motion for summary judgment
75. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
76. 450 F. Supp. 196, 15 Avi. 17101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
77. 357 So. 2d 789, 14 Avi. 17121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
78. 14 Avi. 18280 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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when the carrier sought to limit liability under article 22(2). Even
though the plaintiff neither alleged nor stated facts which tended to
support a finding of "willful misconduct," the court found the carrier's
motion was premature and that the plaintiff must "be given the op-
portunity to develop the record in situations where the salient facts
are solely with the defendant." 
79
In Williams v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,8 0 a federal district court
refused to strike the defendant's affirmative defense of contributory
negligence on the part of plaintiff's decedent. The court first deter-
mined that article 17 (personal injuries), article 20(1) (due care) and
article 21 (contributory negligence) created a presumption of liability.
They then concluded that the elimination by the Montreal Agree-
ment, of the article 20(1) due care defense, served to create absolute
liability, but not to eliminate the defense of contributory negligence.
The court called the Montreal Agreement a "quasi-legal and largely
experimental system of liability that is essentially contractual in na-
ture" 81 and noted that its legal effect is uncertain. The court rejected
the defendant's argument that the Agreement's preclusion of recovery
for willfully causing damage demonstrated the understanding that the
contributory negligence defense had been deleted. The willful injury
provision was specifically aimed at intentional terrorist activity and
was not meant to alter the contributory negligence defense.
In Cohen v. Varig Airlines,8 2 plaintiffs sought damages for loss of
baggage and for the resulting physical inconvenience, discomfort, and
mental distress. With eighteen days of a multi-stop tour remaining,
plaintiffs deplaned in Rio de Janiero and were bussed with the other
passengers to a waiting area in order to board a jet aircraft to con-
tinue Varig flight #854 to New York. Plaintiffs continually cautioned
Varig employees that they were not continuing to New York, that
their baggage had not arrived, that they had eighteen days remaining
on their tour with no other clothes than the ones on their backs and
that they were due to depart Rio de Janiero on an early morning
flight. After much complaining and some apparent efforts to locate
the baggage, Varig personnel refused to unload the flight bound for
New York to locate the baggage. Varig employees further stated that
79. Id. at 18282.
80. 442 F. Supp. 455, 14 Avi. 18465 (E.D. La. 1977).
81. 442 F. Supp. at 457, 14 Avi. at 18466 (citing L. Kreindler, Aviation Accident
Law §. 12A.07(l) at 12A-12).
82. 62 App. Div. 324, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 44, 15 Avi. 17112 (1978).
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they "would not go to the expense of unloading the plane" and that
plaintiffs would receive the baggage on a return flight in two days.
Plaintiffs never did receive the baggage and were forced to complete
the trip with the same single set of clothes supplemented by those
that they found in the local communities after many hours of shop-
ping.
The court found that Varig intentionally omitted "to perform a
manifest duty which it owed plaintiffs under the terms of the contract
of carriage, with a realization and disregard of probable consequences
of its conduct." 83 Varig's actions constituted willful misconduct
under article 25(1) and, therefore, the liability limit of article 2 2 (a)
was inapplicable. While the majority awarded damages for the actual
loss of the baggage, they refused to allow recovery for the mental
distress and physical inconvenience caused by lost or mishandled
baggage. Since the Warsaw Convention governs the nature of in-
juries, but does not specify the elements of allowable damages,14 the
carrier's tariff which excluded consequential or special damages, pre-
cluded any recovery by the plaintiff for mental distress. Judge
Lupiano dissented on the ground that an intentional omission of a
manifest duty was not proven. From the facts presented, the Warsaw
Convention liability limitation was applicable because the evidence
establishing Varig's intent was only circumstantial. Judge Sandier dis-
sented from the majority's exclusion of damages for mental distress.
In Dalton v. Delta Airlines,8 5 a plaintiff sought to recover dam-
ages for the suffocation death of racing dogs on a flight segment cov-
ered by article 1. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment because plaintiff failed to give written complaint
to the carrier within seven days of his discovery of the "damage" to
goods as required by article 26. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, reversed and held that "where destruction of goods oc-
curs on an international flight, the shipper-consignee need not give
Article 26(3) notice." After discussion of the general doctrine of treaty
construction, the court distinguished between total loss or destruction
and mere damage or delay. The common factor in lost or destroyed,
as opposed to merely damaged, goods is that they are totally without
economic value to the shipper/consignee. Therefore, notice of the loss
83. 62 App. Div. at 332-33, 405 N.Y.S. 2d at 48, 15 Avi. at 17115 (1978).
84. See Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y. 2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
85. 570 F.2d 1244, 14 Avi. 18425 (5th Cir. 1978).
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to the carrier would serve no useful purpose. The court noted that
the carcass of a trained racing dog is, like the pieces of a shattered
bottle of rare brandy, a destroyed, and not merely a damaged, good.
Denied Boarding
In Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 8 6 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, affirmed an award of compensatory damages for un-
just discrimination based on section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation
Act 8 7 for Piedmont's failure to follow its own boarding priority. How-
ever, since the carrier's tort was not "aggravated by evil motive, ac-
tual malice, deliberate violence or oppression," 8 8 the award of puni-
tive damages was reversed.
In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., s9 plaintiff Ralph Nader re-
covered compensatory and punitive damages for a "denied boarding."
On appeal of plaintiff's original action, the United States Supreme
Court held that a bumped passenger who is denied boarding need
not await a determination by the Civil Aeronautics Board before pro-
ceeding on a common law claim for misrepresentation. 90 Upon re-
mand, the federal district court first awarded compensatory damages
for the carrier's failure to follow its boarding priority, a violation of
section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. 9 1 Compensatory damages
were also awarded for the common law tort of fraudulent misrep-
resentation. In reaching its decision to award damages to passenger
Nader, the court found that defendant Allegheny had a duty to dis-
close the existence of its overbooking practice to its passengers; its
failure to do so subjected it to liability. Plaintiff Nader was due to
speak before the Connecticut Citizens Action Group (CCAG) on the
day of the denied boarding and was unable to fulfill his commitments
due to his delay. Although Allegheny also failed to inform the direc-
tor of CCAG of the overbooking practice when he inquired if plaintiff
Nader had a "confirmed reservation," the court refused to award
damages, holding that:
plaintiff, CCAG, was too remote from the transaction to be owed
a duty by defendant .. .and .... in the absence of such a duty, a
86. 567 F.2d 290, 14 Avi. 18327 (5th Cir. 1978).
87. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
88. 567 F.2d at 292, 14 Avi. 18328 (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 167
U.S. App. D.C. 350, 372, 512 F.2d 527, 549, rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290
(1976)).
89. 445 F. Supp. 168, 14 Avi. 18312 (D.D.C. 1978).
90. 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
91. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
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plaintiff may not recover, even if all the elements of the common-
law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation have been proved.
92
However, the court indicated that it would have awarded damages to
this indirect third party if the director of CCAG had identified him-
self, his organization, or the reason for the call. Such additional infor-
mation would presumably have given the airline reason to know of
the third party's reliance.
The court further awarded punitive damages of $15,000 to plaintiff
Nader, rejecting defendant's arguments that overbooking was a com-
mon industry practice and that the CAB had since adopted a rule
requiring disclosure. The court did not address the issue of punitive
damage awards to third parties, since the CCAG did not recover on
the primary cause of action.
In Economic Regulation ER-1050, the CAB issued its final rule
regarding priority rules, denied boarding compensation tariffs, and
reports of unaccommodated passengers. 93 Overbooking, selling more
"confirmed reserved" seats than are actually available for sale, is a
method employed by most air carriers in an attempt to compensate
for "no-shows." A no-show is a passenger who holds a "confirmed
reservation" for a seat, fails to show up at flight time and does not
notify the carrier of his intent not to use the space. In the fiscal year
ending June of 1977, denied boardings on U.S. carriers were approx-
imately 130,000 passengers on domestic flights and 12,000 on interna-
tional flights, while denied boardings on foreign carriers to and from
the United States were estimated to have been 10,000 passengers.
Foreign carriers argued strenuously against continued application
of Part 250 to foreign carriers on flights "originating or terminating at,
or serving" a United States point. Despite a decline in the rate of
denied boardings, the complications of administering a system where
the passengers speak several languages and the potential for the con-
flict of laws of different nations, the CAB retained this jurisdiction
over foreign carriers.
The new system allows much carrier flexibility in determining
the amount of compensation offered to volunteers for denied board-
ing, the method and content of the solicitation, and the overbooking
formula utilized in the carrier's reservations system. Furthermore,
92. 445 F. Supp. at 176, 14 Avi. 18316.
93. 43 Fed. Reg. 24277 (1978) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 250).
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the carrier is free to use advance payment requirements and ticket
refund penalties or "conditional reservations" at a reduced price.
Carriers must first seek volunteers to be denied boarding at a
compensation to be determined by the judgment of the carriers. If an
insufficient number of volunteers come forward, the carrier must then
deny boarding to non-volunteers according to its published boarding
priorities and then only to those non-volunteers who were informed
that they were in danger of being bumped and of the compensation
to be received. Denied boarding compensation (DBC) is set at 200%
of the passenger's remaining tickets to his first stopover but is limited
to a minimum of $75 and maximum of $400. If the carrier arranges
alternative air transportation to arrive within two hours of the original
arrival time in the case of interstate and overseas air transportation
(four hours in the case of foreign air transportation), the DBC and the
limits are halved. The carrier need not pay DBC if the passenger did
not comply with the carrier's procedures for check-in, if substitution
of a smaller aircraft is required for safety or operational reasons, or if
the passenger is accommodated on the flight but is merely in a differ-
ent class of service.
UNITED STATES TREATY INFORMATION**
Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on
board aircraft. Done at Tokyo, September 14, 1963. Entered into
force: December 4, 1969. TIAS 6768. Accession deposited: Peru (with
reservations), May 12,1978.
Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on interna-
tional civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Vienna, July 7, 1971. En-
tered into force: December 19, 1974. TIAS 8092. Ratification depos-
ited: Venezula, February 3, 1978.
Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on interna-
tional civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal, October 16, 1974.
Not in force. Ratifications deposited: Argentina, February 1, 1978;
Cuba, November 25, 1977; Venezuela, February 3, 1978.
Protocol on authentic quadrilingual text of the convention on in-
ternational civil aviation. (Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex.
Done at Montreal, September 30, 1977. Not in force. Acceptance de-
posited: Colombia, May 4, 1978.
**Treaty information compiled from 1978 Department of State Bulle-
tins.
